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Abstract 
New developments and significant changes are under way in the world trading system. We are witnessing a 
revival of trading nations’ interest in international trade agenda and trade talks, which have taken a backseat since 
the economic downturn following the global crisis. The improved outlook for global trade growth, but also the acute 
need for adjusting the world trading system to the ongoing structural changes in the spheres of international trade 
and industrial organization are, essentially, behind this policy shift. This paper takes stock of recent developments in 
the world trading system and highlights the prospects for global trade governance. It focuses on three issues: (1) the 
significance of the Ninth WTO Ministerial Conference in December 2013 for resuming global trade cooperation; (2) 
the recent drive towards plurilateral sector-specific trade deals; and (3) the outstanding pace and scale of 
negotiations on new preferential trade agreements (PTAs). The paper concludes with a discussion of the future 
direction of the world trading system. It argues that despite improved prospects for multilateral trade liberalization, 
the world trading system is becoming more fragmented and less coherent, and also more uncertain, being 
increasingly driven by PTAs and a variable geometry approach to WTO trade agreements. 
 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of the Scientific Committee of ESPERA 2014. 
Keywords: the world trading system; the World Trade Organization (WTO); Doha Round; trade policy; trade 




* Tel.: +4-021-317-9630; 
E-mail address: agnesghibutiu@clicknet.ro 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of the Scientific Committee of ESPERA 2014
423 Agnes Ghibutiu /  Procedia Economics and Finance  22 ( 2015 )  422 – 431 
1. Introduction 
 
In recent years, developments in the sphere of international trade have been driven by larger macroeconomic 
trends unlike policy changes in the years prior to the global financial crisis, when market opening efforts have 
largely contributed to the expansion of international trade flows. This is because, on the one hand, the international 
trade agenda and trade talks have taken a backseat since the economic downturn following the 2008-09 crisis. The 
trading community and particularly the key players have been primarily preoccupied with domestic economic issues 
to mitigate the negative effects of the crisis and thus have given less attention to global trade talks. On the other 
hand, global trade cooperation and especially the process of multilateral trade liberalization has virtually stalled 
since 2008, when the Doha Round – the first round of multilateral talks under the auspices of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), launched in November 2001 – entered in impasse. With the stalemate in the multilateral trade 
talks, two of the WTO’s core functions have been blocked, namely: negotiating trade opening and crafting 
multilateral rules. Hence, over the last decade, multilateral market opening has notably slowed down and trade 
liberalization continued only unilaterally and regionally. Hower, the results have been mixed and also largely offset 
by protectionist measures initiated by countries wordwide during the crisis and post-crisis years, despite pledges 
made repeatedly to refrain from protectionist behaviour.   
The present situation might be reversed in the near future, with trade policy being likely to resume its important 
role played once in shaping world trade. A first argument underpinning such an expectation relates to the improved 
outlook for global trade in 2014-2015 as global output is projected to strengthen gradually. Indeed, all forecasts 
released in the first part of 2014 converge that world trade will gain momentum over the next two years following 
sluggish pace of growth in the post-crisis years, especially in the past two years. According to WTO projections, 
trade growth will double to over 4% in 2014 with the prospect of a further acceleration to over 5% in 2015, even if it 
remains below the pre-crisis average rate of 6.0% for 1990-2008 (WTO, 2014a). A second argument relates to the 
revival of the global trade agenda in 2013 after being largely neglected in the post-crisis years. Two major factors 
are behind this change. First, some progress on multilateral trade talks has been achieved at the Ninth WTO 
Ministerial Conference, held in December 2013 in Bali (Indonesia). Second, significant developments occurred in 
the sphere of trade regionalism, with several large negotiations being launched in 2013 with the aim to conclude new 
preferential trade agreements (PTAs)†. Unlike other similar undertakings in the past, these new initiatives have the 
potential to cover most of global trade and thus trigger substantial changes in the world trading system. 
Starting from the few remarks above, this paper reviews a number of recent developments occurred in the world 
trading system with a view to shed light on their consequences for global trade and its governance mechanisms. In 
doing so, the paper draws on insights from current literature and relies on statistical data provided by the WTO and 
other relevant international organizations. It is organised as follows: Section 2 presents in a nutshell the most 
important developments that have marked the global trade scene since the establishment of the WTO in 1995, and 
outlines the major challenges facing currently the multilateral trading system. Section 3 looks at the significance of 
the Ninth WTO Ministerial Conference in December 2013 and evaluates the prospects for resuming global trade 
cooperation and relaunching the Doha Round. Subject of the analysis in Section 4 is the push towards sector-specific 
plurilateral trade deals within and outside the WTO and the resulting variable geometry approach to WTO trade 
agreements. Section 5 examines the unabated drive towards trade regionalism among WTO membership and 
highlights some of the challenges raised for the multilateral trading system by the current negotiations on large 





† The term preferential trade agreement (PTA) is used throughout this paper to refer to customs unions, free trade agreements, and interim 
arrangements leading to one of them, as stipulated by GATT Article XXIV and GATS Article V. The author has deliberately opted for the term 
PTA instead of RTA (regional trade agreement) used by the WTO, but it has the same connotation. 
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2. The fast-changing trade landscape and the challenges for the multilateral trading system  
 
The WTO has been established in 1995 as a result of the Uruguay Round (1986-1994). The organization is the 
successor of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and stands for the system which provides for 
multilateral trade opening, global trade rule-making and enforcement of these rules. As such, the multilateral trade 
arrangements under the administration of the WTO are at the very heart of the world trading system, ensuring the 
organization’s centricity in global trade governance.  
In the years following the establishment of the WTO, international trade has for the most part expanded rapidly 
and outpaced global output growth. The value of global trade in goods and services exceeded $23 trillion in 2013, 
increasing almost four times compared to 1995 (WTO, 2014a). Nevertheless, with a 12.5% decline in 2009, world 
trade also experienced a historic collapse during the recent global recession. World trade bounced back to its 2008 
level in 2010, but due to sluggish recovery and lack of progress in liberalization, it has no longer outpaced (real) 
global GDP growth. For the past two years, global trade growth has averaged just 2.2% and is projected to only 
moderately rebound in 2014 and expand by a slightly faster rate in 2015. Hence, trade has still a long way to go until 
fully recovering from the negative impact of the 2008-09 crisis.  
More importantly, since the creation of the WTO in the mid-90s, global trade has been marked by sweeping 
structural changes, driven mainly by rapid progress in the development of transport, information and communication 
technologies (ICTs), but also by market opening worldwide. As a result, new economic players and new patterns of 
trade have emerged, dramatically altering the nature of trade and economic interdependence among nations. The 
world economy and global trade relations became more complex. The WTO itself has seen major transformations, 
whether in terms of issues in the agenda or in geopolitical terms. Domestic trade politics have also become more 
complex and trade deals have increased in complexity because the nature of obstacles to trade has evolved (Lamy, 
2013). Nowadays, trade deals are no longer confined to negotiating just the reduction of tariffs, but also non-tariff 
barriers and behind-the-border regulations, which have gained enormous importance but are more difficult to tackle.  
The rapidly evolving global trade scene raises several challenges for the multilateral trading system. Especially 
two deserve a particular attention as they concern two interrelated developments of utmost relevance in terms of 
their consequences for global trade and its governance mechanisms. Firstly, numerous developing countries, 
especially in Asia, have emerged as major players in global trade, such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China 
and South Africa). Today, these countries account for more than half of the world’s economic activity and over half 
of global exports, with China becoming the number one world exporter. A similar picture of shifting composition 
arises with respect to foreign direct investment (FDI): while global FDI inflows have stagnated over the last decade, 
emerging and developing countries’ share has risen to over half.  
The rise of emerging economies has meant that these economies have come to play an ever-growing role in the 
world economy and to account for an increasing share of economic activity. The shift in economic power and 
influence within the world economy has profound implications for international trade cooperation and global 
leadership. Essentially, this means that the long-standing equilibrium in global trade cooperation based on the former 
two-speed model of a world divided between developed and developing countries no longer reflects today’s 
economic realities. Hence, serious conceptual adjustments are needed and a new balance between reciprocity and 
flexibility in a multidimensional membership must be found if the WTO is to deliver on multilateral trade opening 
and designing global trade rules (Lamy, 2013). But adjusting politically and organizationally to the new realities will 
take time, and until a new equilibrium in global trade cooperation will emerge multilateralism is under pressure. 
Another significant change in the sphere of international trade that raises major challenges for the multilateral 
trading system is the spread of globally-integrated production chains – in effect, “global factories” – as firms locate 
various stages of the production process in the most cost-efficient markets. Rapid advances in ICTs, falling transport 
costs, backed by open trade and investment policies, have changed production structures and triggered a major 
structural shift in international trade, giving rise to the so-called ”supply-chain trade” or ”21st century trade”. A vast 
and growing amount of world trade is now conducted through global supply chains, whereby parts and components 
cross many borders as production is shared in many different locations. About 80% of global trade in goods and 
services is linked to supply chains, according to estimates (UNCTAD, 2013a, p. 135). It means that today’s goods 
are “made in the world” as most products are assembled with inputs from many countries. This production sharing is 
very different from the traditional way of trading, as it combines cross-border flows of goods, investment, services, 
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know-how and people associated with supply chains that are typically under the control of lead companies from 
developed countries. Essentially, this new form of trade combines capital and technology from advanced countries 
and cheap labour from developing countries. While traditional trade is mostly about selling things internationally, 
supply-chain trade is much more complex and is mostly about making things internationally (Baldwin, 2012, p. 1). 
Moreover, the latter is the fastest growing segment of global trade and calls for deeper integration among 
participants. However, current WTO rules and disciplines are not equipped to deal with issues related to supply-
chain trade as they have been designed to facilitate traditional trade, i.e. selling goods and services internationally. In 
the absence of global regulation, the rules related to supply-chain trade have been devised outside the WTO, 
predominantly through PTAs. Hence, the WTO is constrained to take better account of the growing importance of 
supply-chain trade, by devising proper trade and investment rules to support the evolution of global supply chains, 
which involve both developed and developing economies.   
In short, while new economic and geo-political trends have emerged, the rules governing multilateral cooperation 
have not kept pace with these changes. In fact, the global rule-book remained stuck in the 90s, when it was adopted 
as an outcome of the Uruguay Round. This is why WTO members agreed to start a new round of multilateral trade 
negotiations, thus acknowledging the need for international trade rules to better reflect the fast-changing pace of 
trade. Indeed, the Doha Round, launched in November 2001 included among its main objectives not only the further 
liberalization of international trade, but also the adjustment of WTO rules and disciplines to bring them in line with 
the new realities in the world economy. But the talks stalled in 2008 largely over a divide between developed and 
developing countries on major issues such as industrial tariffs, agriculture subsidies, and non-tariff barriers. Opening 
trade and devising multilateral rules has been further affected by the biggest economic crisis since the 1930s, which 
diverted attention from the global trade agenda and spurred the promotion of defensive trade policies and even 
protectionist actions worldwide. It was not until the Ninth WTO Ministerial Conference in Bali (Indonesia), in 
December 2013, that a window of opportunity arose for overcoming the deadlock in multilateral talks.  
 
3. The renewed prospects for trade multilateralism: the Bali Package 
 
The successful outcome of the Bali Ministerial Conference introduced a new perspective on resuming multilateral 
cooperation among the trading nations of the world. In Bali, trade ministers from the 159 WTO member states 
managed to adopt the so-called Bali Package, consisting of a set of measures to liberalize and spur international 
trade, including the Agreement on Trade Facilitation (WTO, 2013). Though the package covers only a modest part 
of the ambitious Doha agenda and envisages merely trade facilitation and some aspects related to agriculture and 
development (e.g. food security, export subsidies, tariff-and quota-free market access for least developed countries), 
this multilateral deal achieved after more than twelve-year Doha Round negotiations is of particular relevance.   
Firstly, the Bali Package is a historic step as it represents the first comprehensive agreement achieved since the 
creation of the WTO in 1995. It does provide reassurance that the WTO can still deliver in terms of multilaterally 
agreed outcomes and trade multilateralism still does work. Once implemented, the package would provide a strong 
incentive for the global economy, generating growth and jobs, badly needed in the current global context marked by 
subdued growth. The new Agreement on Trade Facilitation is perhaps the most important element in the Bali 
Package in terms of rule-making. It provides for simplification and streamlining customs procedures, increasing 
transparency and reducing bureaucracy, thereby significantly reducing the costs of cross-border trade. And not least, 
it may be seen as the first multilateral deal that aims at promoting 21st century supply-chain trade. Yet, the views 
about the economic impact of the new trade liberalization measures are contradictory. WTO estimates the Bali 
Package to give a boost of up to $1 trillion annually to global economy and trade (i.e. 1.3% of world GDP in 2013). 
In the view of others, the predicted trade and development gains are still unclear and, hence, the package will hardly 
affect world economic prospects in the short and medium run.  
Secondly, the positive result of the Bali Ministerial Conference is a clear signal that the WTO resumed two of its 
central functions, namely that of providing a forum for multilateral talks aimed at trade opening and its legislative 
function ensuring the establishment of new trade rules. Due to the continuing stalemate in the Doha Round trade 
talks, the credibility of rule-making on trade in the WTO came under intense scrutiny, and the organization’s 
centricity in global trade governance continued to erode. Some critics have been tempted to suggest that the round is 
a lost cause and should be abandoned, that the WTO is in crisis, that trade multilateralism does not function, and that 
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the organization has become irrelevant. In this light, Bali was a transformative moment for the WTO, proving that 
the multilateral trading system can function as a viable and effective negotiating forum. Moreover, Bali has created 
an opportunity for reviving the multilateral trading system, strengthening the credibility of the WTO and restoring its 
central role in global cooperation and trade governance.  
Last but not least the favourable outcome of the Bali Ministerial Conference is an important stepping stone 
towards the completion of the Doha Round as WTO members have committed to conclude the trade talks launched 
in 2001. For this purpose, the WTO was mandated to develop a clearly defined work program on the remaining 
Doha agenda issues by the end of 2014 (WTO, 2013). 
Evidently, it is still too early to judge whether the Bali Package will be able to generate enough impetus to unlock 
the Doha Round and produce ultimately a broad agreement along the lines of the initially quite ambitious Doha trade 
agenda. However, the prospects for such an alternative are not very bright, in the view of most observers. It is quite 
clear, that the package represents only a limited success and is far less than the original Doha agenda. The really big 
problems that have in fact led to the deadlock in the multilateral negotiations, such as market access for non-
agricultural goods and services, domestic agricultural subsidies, and agricultural import tariffs, remained essentially 
untouched so far. Some issues have not even been discussed in nearly 6 years. Therefore, it is still unclear how the 
thorny issues will be tackled. It appears more likely that the round will be progressively sliced into issues, with the 
least controversial ones being picked out for an earlier consideration – possibly through plurilateral negotiations – in 
order to conclude, once and for all, the Doha Round (Draper et al., 2014, p. 7; Dadush, 2014). This scenario is all the 
more plausible as it seems to be supported by several recent developments that point towards a renewed interest of 
WTO members in plurilateral negotiations, both within and outside the organization, as seen below.  
 
4. The push towards plurilateral approaches: the variable geometry of WTO trade agreements    
 
The Bali Ministerial Conference also highlighted the need for WTO members to rethink their approach and adopt 
a process of more flexible engagement that may allow them to overcome the well-known obstacles that have 
paralyzed action in the past. According to most observers, the WTO should move to more efficient models of 
negotiation, involving a smaller number of players but willing to engage in negotiations on a limited set of issues – 
the so-called ”plurilateral agreements”. In other words, instead of the current model of negotiation, which requires 
all WTO members to reach an agreement on all issues (according to the single undertaking principle), more flexible 
modalities should be adopted for ensuring progress in future negotiations in other relatively narrow areas of the 
Doha trade agenda or in areas that transcend this agenda (Dadush, 2014).  
As a matter of fact, several important undertakings with a group of WTO members are being conducted in the 
WTO itself, but also outside the organization with the aim to establish plurilateral trade deals. Yet, even if concluded 
within the WTO, such deals apply only to those members that have agreed to be bound by them.    
Sectoral initiatives are not new in the history of GATT/WTO. The GATT adopted in 1947 to establish rules of 
general application to regulate trade in all goods made few references to specific products or sectors. Over time, 
however, GATT contracting parties developed rules to tackle these kind of problems, too. Earlier rounds of 
multilateral negotiations (e.g. the Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds) resulted in a number of sector-specific agreements 
that aimed to regulate trade in certain products or areas. Similarly, the outcome of the Uruguay Round included in 
addition to multilateral agreements several plurilateral agreements, i.e. on government procurement, trade in civil 
aircraft, dairy and bovine meat. The results of sectoral initiatives were usually ”multilateralized” through binding the 
reduction commitments in the schedules of concessions of the participants (WTO, 2012, p. 8).  
The experience gained in negotiating these sectoral initiatives provided the foundation on which several WTO 
plurilaterals were built. Likewise, they proved that the organization could serve as an effective forum to open 
markets without launching a formal round of multilateral talks and promote market opening beyond what can be 
achieved in a multilateral framework, respectively. The expansion of the Information Technology Agreement (ITA) 
signed in 1997 is a case in point. ITA covers trade in IT products and is subject to current renegotiations to extend 
and deepen its provisions. As further opening of IT products market is crucial for facilitating supply-chain trade, 
many participants, including the EU and the U.S., are seeking to renegotiate ITA to extend its product coverage. If 
the original agreement included only 28 WTO members, with the participation of Russia since September 2013 the 
ITA has grown to include 78 members, accounting for 96% of the rapidly expanding world trade in IT products. 
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Because ITA participants provide duty-free treatment to imports on a most-favoured-nation (MFN) basis, they have 
created opportunities for exporters in all WTO members, including the least-developed countries (WTO, 2012, p. 3).  
Another example is the expansion of the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA). This plurilateral 
deal has been renegotiated in 2012 and its revised version extending market access commitments entered into force 
in April 2014. According to estimates, the parties to the revised GPA – i.e. 43 WTO members, including the EU – 
will see gains in market access of US$ 80-100 billion annually for their businesses (WTO, 2014b). Already 10 other 
WTO members have applied to join the GPA and a further 5 are going to join under their WTO accession protocols. 
The initiative on environmental goods is the most recent example for plurilateral negotiations in the WTO that 
may result in trade liberalization in a non-discriminatory way. On 8 July 2014, 14 WTO members (including the EU) 
launched plurilateral negotiations for an Environmental Goods Agreement at the WTO to liberalize trade in 
environmental goods (WTO, 2014c). The participants account for 86% of global environmental goods trade. The 
negotiations aim at promoting green growth and sustainable development through eliminating tariffs on a wide range 
of environmental goods and also addressing non-tariff barriers and environmental services. The talks are open to any 
WTO member and the results will be applied in accordance with the MFN principle.  
Finally, a somewhat different initiative is the Trade in Services Agreement (TISA) which is negotiated since 
March 2013 outside the WTO and relates exclusively to services. Unlike the multilateral GATS (General Agreement 
on Trade in Services) within the WTO, the TISA Agreement is a plurilateral initiative involving a group of 23 like-
minded WTO members (including the EU) that are willing to advance market opening for services. The group 
accounts for almost 70% of world trade in services (see Table 1). The stated objective of the plurilateral negotiations 
is to deepen commitments in services and develop new and enhanced trade rules and disciplines – an objective that 
remained unfulfilled so far through the Doha Round. TISA is negotiated outside the WTO, but its proponents aim to 
produce an ambitious agreement, compatible with the GATS, that would attract broad participation, and which could 
be later multilateralized, once a critical mass of participants is achieved (European Commission, 2014).  
Certainly, the WTO will continue to remain the most appropriate forum for negotiating market access issues in 
goods (e.g. import duties) or services, reduction of subsidies or many other aspects concerning trade rules, since 
these issues can only be addressed in a multilateral framework. While multilateral solutions are preferable to any 
other solutions, plurilateral agreements concluded under the remit of the WTO prove to be nevertheless a viable way 
to ensure progress in market opening in certain sectors. But it is equally true that these agreements depart from the 
fundamental single undertaking principle of the WTO, which requires that any package of liberalization measures 
should be adopted by all member states as a unique action. In addition, plurilateral agreements often contradict MFN 
treatment, which is another cornerstone of the WTO.  
 
5. The exponential rise in preferential trade agreements: facts and implications 
 
But probably the most spectacular developments in 2013 have occurred outside the multilateral trading system, 
namely in the sphere of trade regionalism. And though the WTO has again come into the spotlight due to the positive 
outcome of its last Ministerial Conference, the attention in the government and in the private sector continues to be 
focused on the large regional and bilateral trade initiatives which are currently being negotiated. 
Lack of progress in the Doha Round and thus the inability to adjust WTO trade rules and disciplines to the rapid 
and large-scale structural changes in the world economy and global trade have led many countries of the world to 
increasingly resort to ways of regulation and liberalization of markets that lie outside the multilateral framework of 
the WTO. As a result, the international trading system is regulated by an increasing number of preferential trade 
agreements (PTAs), most of which represent deeper trade deals that address rules beyond traditional tariffs or 
traditional preferential access. As of 2012, about 60% of trade of developed countries, as well as of Latin American 
countries and transition economies occurs under some form of PTA (UNCTAD, 2013b, p. 18). The share of trade 
under PTAs is lower in the East Asian (40%) and Sub-Saharan African and South Asian countries (30%), but is 
increasing rapidly particularly in Asia, due to the shift of global trade flows towards emerging Asian economies.  
PTA activity has continued unabated among the WTO membership over the last decade. Available figures on the 
numerical surge in PTAs are self-evident: on average 14 such agreements have entered into force annually since 
2003. It is noteworthy that only between October 2012 and November 2013, WTO members have notified 23 new 
PTAs to the WTO. As of 15 June 2014, the total number of regional and bilateral PTAs notified to the WTO reached 
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some 585 (counting goods, services and accessions separately). Of these, 379 were in force (WTO, 2014d,e).  
But the numerical proliferation of PTAs is only one facet of the process of greater integration of the world 
economy. The last decade has also witnessed a rise in the relevance of deeper PTAs for the majority of countries. A 
growing number of PTAs take the form of deeper integration, with trade rules going beyond traditional tariffs and 
existing WTO rule-making agreements, or even existing PTAs, to address regulatory measures that are not covered 
by WTO rules and disciplines. In 2012, with the exception of agreements in South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, West 
Asia and North Africa, the majority of PTAs took the form of such deeper agreements (UNCTAD, 2013b, p. 18). 
Most importantly, the pace and scale of negotiations on PTAs further accelerated in 2013, with a whole series of 
new PTA negotiations being launched by WTO members accounting for large shares of world trade and global GDP. 
Major PTA developments in 2013 have included the start of negotiations on several large regional and bilateral 
PTAs – the so-called ”mega-PTAs” – by the major trading powers, the U.S., the EU and Japan, namely: (1) the start 
of negotiations, in March 2013, on an EU-Japan free trade agreement; (2) the joining by Japan, in March 2013, of 
the negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP); (3) the launch of plurilateral negotiations, in 
March 2013, on a new Trade in Services Agreement (TISA); (4) the start of negotiations, in July 2013, on a Trans-
Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the U.S. and the EU. The start of negotiations in 
November 2013 on an EU-China investment agreement is also worth mentioning. And to all these new initiatives, 
numerous other PTAs should be added (e.g. EU-Canada, EU-Singapore, China-Switzerland, and Australia-Republic 
of Korea) that are waiting for final approval or ratification (UN/DESA, 2014, p. 58). 
 












in 2012 (%) 
Goods GDP, 
combined 
(% to world 
GDP) 
Number of other 




Intra-trade as a 
share of global 
trade (%) 
Export Import 
RCEP 16 24.2 47.1 41.9 28 23 
Pacific Alliance 4 2,7 4.3 3.9 2.8 6 
TPP 12 26.3 38.3 46.2 38.3 35 
TTIP 2 43.6 14.7 17.2 44.9 0 
Tripartite Agreement 26 1.5 26.4 2.1 1.4 4 
TISA 23 69.31 - - 56.5  
Notes: 1 Only reflects the share in world trade in services. 
Source: WTO (2014d, p. 55). 
 
As admitted in WTO circles, it is unlikely that this strong upward trend in regionalism is going to be stemmed as 
a number of agreements have been signed and will soon enter into force, or are being negotiated, most of them 
between partners in different geographical regions. Like agreements in force, most new negotiations are bilateral. 
Among the key bilateral negotiations in terms of the parties’ share in world trade rank: the TTIP between the EU and 
the U.S., MERCOSUR-EU, EU-Japan, EU-India, Australia-China, Canada-Korea, and Canada-India (WTO, 2014d, 
p. 54). While most PTAs are bilateral, there is also a push towards establishing plurilateral PTAs or consolidating 
existing bilateral agreements among a group of members. Several examples illustrate this more recent trend, namely: 
(1) negotiations in the Asia-Pacific Region for a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement, launched in 2010, and 
currently involving 12 parties, including the U.S. and a number of American and Asian states; (2) the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Agreement, negotiated since 2012 and aiming to harmonize existing 
bilateral agreements between the 10 economies of ASEAN and 6 others (Australia, China, India, Japan, the Republic 
of Korea, and New Zealand); (3) the Pacific Alliance in Latin America, which brings together Chile, Colombia, 
Mexico and Peru; and (4) the Tripartite Free Trade Area Agreement in Africa, striving to consolidate three existing 
plurilateral agreements related to the East African Community (EAC), the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and involving 26 parties.  
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Hence, current PTA negotiations often involve multiple parties and/or parties accounting for major shares of 
world trade and global GDP (see Table 1). But most surprising is the number of negotiations on ”mega-PTAs” 
initiated by the largest developed economies of the world. Among these, two major initiatives stand out for their 
sheer size and ambition: the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the U.S. and the EU, 
and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) between the U.S. and 11 American and Asian states. If successfully 
concluded, these mega-agreements have the potential to reshape the global trading system given that they encompass 
a significant proportion of global trade (Draper et al., 2014, p. 7).  
The outstanding revival of the PTA agenda in 2013 and especially the major trading powers’ new trade initiatives 
have given new impetus to the PTA debate and prompted worldwide discussions on the future of the world trading 
system. Essentially, the debate in academic and policy circles triggered by the surge in PTA activity since the mid-
1990s revolved around the question whether PTAs were ”building blocks” or ”stumbling blocks” for the multilateral 
trading system. Particularly three major arguments have been raised against PTAs, i.e.: the exclusion of agriculture 
from coverage, and hence from significant liberalization in most PTAs; the complex and restrictive rules of origin 
established by PTAs; and the varied treatment of trade remedy laws within PTAs (Schaefer, 2007, p. 586). While 
these arguments are still largely valid, the unabated proliferation of PTAs and the impossibility to stem the tide of 
regionalism have moved the policy debate towards accepting the existence of PTAs. The WTO itself has adopted a 
more tolerant stance towards PTAs, focusing mainly on devising mechanisms to ensure that PTA activity 
complements rather than detracts from the WTO system. The new transparency mechanism for all PTAs established 
in December 2006 in the WTO is a case in point.  
Nevertheless, opinions on PTAs continue to be strongly controversial. Proponents of PTAs and especially “mega-
PTAs” such as the TPP and TTIP have suggested that they aim at constituting alternatives to multilateral 
liberalization and updating of trading rules, while they can also enhance coherence and promote improved WTO 
trade rules, MFN liberalization, and deeper regional integration worldwide (UN/DESA, 2014, p. 59). Conversely, 
other observers have expressed serious doubts over the reach and effectiveness of PTAs in general and the TPP and 
TTIP in particular, arguing that the surge in PTAs reduces transparency and uniformity in the global trading system 
and increases transaction and administration costs, particularly for developing-countries.  
Evidently, there are a couple of fundamental differences between the PTAs under negotiation in terms of their 
content and scope and not least their openness towards third parties, but they have also in common a number of 
features, and raise several issues for the multilateral trading system. Firstly, the string of new PTAs such as the TPP, 
RCEP, Pacific Alliance, etc. aim to consolidate and simplify some of the existing and often complex network of 
bilateral relationships and rules of trade between the parties – the so-called ”spaghetti bowl of PTAs”. Yet, it 
remains an open question whether the new deals consolidate these existing relationships or, as has been the case until 
now, simply add another layer of preferences to them. In addition, the openness of these agreements is another 
important element to be considered, both with respect to the possibility for other parties to join in, but also the basic 
characteristics and level of tolerance of their rules of origin in relation to third parties (WTO, 2014d, p. 57).    
A second issue is that a major focus of the new PTAs is regulatory behind-the-border barriers to trade rather than 
only tariff measures at the border. In this regard the agreements aim to go beyond existing provisions in the WTO 
and even in their existing PTAs, striving to promote deep integration between members. In other words, they aim at 
high-standard integration through WTO-plus or WTO-extra provisions on regulatory measures, such as technical 
regulations, standards, sanitary and phytosanitary regulations, services, investment, intellectual property, state aid, 
public procurement, competition policy, environment, and labour market regulations (UN/DESA, 2014, p. 58).  
To the extent that the new PTAs will include issues not currently covered by the WTO multilateral agreements 
this represents an opportunity to negotiate new trade rules and disciplines on these issues, thus helping to build the 
edifice of global trade rules and trade liberalization. But, at the same time, these PTAs may discriminate against 
those WTO members who are not parties to the agreements and result in trade negotiations at two speeds. Moreover, 
with behind-the-border policy regimes becoming so important in PTAs, the multilateral trading system runs the risk 
of regulatory divergence and a resulting fragmentation of markets, which ultimately reduces trading opportunities.  
And last but not least, there are serious concerns about the potential effects of the mega-deals on countries that are 
not part of them, as they will cover an overwhelming part of world trade and are likely to establish new global rules 
and regulations, including standards, that might be inappropriate for their level of development or trade interest. A 
significant number of countries are excluded from their coverage, including both the most dynamic emerging 
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economies (such as the BRICS) and the smallest and most vulnerable ones. Fear of marginalization and negative 
consequences for their competitiveness have led many developing countries to intensify their efforts to promote 




The more favourable global economic setting and the improved outlook for world trade growth have spurred 
trading nations’ interest in the international trade agenda and trade talks, which have been relegated to a backseat 
during the crisis and post-crisis years. Trade policy considerations have once again come back on the main stage and 
even seem to resume their former role in shaping the global trade scene. A couple of developments that occurred in 
2013 both in the multilateral trading system and in the sphere of trade regionalism is evidence of this shift.   
The successful outcome of the WTO Ministerial Conference in Bali, in December 2013, renewed the prospects 
for resuming global trade cooperation and completing the Doha Round, launched in 2001. The multilateral deal 
concluded in Bali after more than twelve-year Doha Round negotiations is the first comprehensive agreement 
achieved since the creation of the WTO in 1995. The so-called Bali Package consists of a set of measures to 
liberalize and spur international trade, including the Agreement on Trade Facilitation. Even if the package covers 
only a modest part of the ambitious Doha trade agenda, it provides reassurance that the WTO can still deliver in 
terms of multilaterally agreed outcomes and that trade multilateralism still does work. WTO members have also 
committed to conclude, once and for all, the trade talks, and the WTO has been mandated to develop a clear work 
program on the remaining Doha agenda issues by the end of 2014. 
The prospects for the Bali Package to generate enough impetus to unlock the Doha Round and produce a broad 
agreement along the lines of the ambitious Doha agenda are still fraught with uncertainties. The thorny issues that 
have in fact led to the deadlock in the Doha Round in 2008, such as market access for non-agricultural goods and 
services, domestic agricultural subsidies, and agricultural import tariffs, remained essentially unresolved. And it is 
still unclear how they will be tackled. Most probably, the round will be progressively sliced into issues, with the 
least controversial ones being selected for an earlier consideration – possibly through plurilateral negotiations. This 
scenario is strongly supported by recent developments suggesting a growing interest of WTO members in plurilateral 
approaches. A case in point are several sector-specific plurilateral deals currently being negotiated both within and 
outside the WTO. While multilateral solutions are preferable to any other solutions, plurilaterals are nevertheless a 
viable way to ensure progress in market opening in certain sectors, though they depart from the fundamental single 
undertaking principle and also often contradict MFN treatment. Hence, the push towards plurilateral deals is likely to 
continue and cover also other sectors such as investment, competition, intellectual property rights, e-commerce, etc. 
This points  towards a consolidation of the variable geometry approach to WTO member commitments.  
Concluding the Doha Round would provide a strong foundation for trade in the future, and a powerful stimulus in 
today’s slow growth environment. It would also largely enable the adjustment of the WTO rules to the structural 
changes that have occurred in global trade and industrial organization. The multilateral trading system built around 
the WTO is currently confronted with three major interrelated challenges. First, the rise of developing countries and 
the consequent powershift in the world economy calls for a new balance in the distribution of rights and obligations 
among WTO members. Second, the WTO is constrained to develop a new trade agenda to tackle behind-the-border 
issues relevant to supply-chain trade, particularly investment policy and non-tariff barriers. Since the global trade 
rule-book has been written twenty years ago, the WTO has not kept up with the need for new rules governing this 
fastly expanding form of trade, which combines trade, investment, intellectual property and services. The new 
generation of PTAs, such as the TPP, proved to be the fastest and most efficient way to meet the need of countries to 
create less restrictive trade and investment rules to facilitate their access to supply chains. Hence, a third major 
challenge facing the WTO is the explosion of trade regionalism and its impact on multilateral trade arrangements.  
While Bali has created an opportunity for strengthening the credibility of the WTO and restoring its central role in 
global cooperation and trade governance, the focus in the government and private sector continues to be on the large 
regional and bilateral trade initiatives which are currently being negotiated. The PTA agenda witnessed an 
outstanding revival in 2013, with several bilateral and regional PTA negotiations being launched. Most surprising is 
the number of the so-called ”mega-PTAs” initiated by the largest developed economies and aiming to promote deep 
integration among members. If successfully concluded, these mega-deals have the potential to reshape the global 
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trading system as they cover an overwhelming proportion of global trade and go well beyond existing provisions in 
the WTO, and even in their existing PTAs. Even though PTAs may be seen as complementing the multilateral 
trading system, they pose a major risk to it. They may lead to a further fragmentation of the system by creating 
multiple trade regimes and increasing transaction costs. They also have the potential to distort trade flows and trigger 
numerous consequences for non-party states, and the global trading system as a whole.  
Undoubtedly, the far-reaching economic and geo-political changes in the international trade landscape call for a 
re-configuration, rethink and adjustment of traditional multilateral cooperation so as to better reflect the fast-
changing pace of trade and better serve the interest of the global community. This is however a long-term goal. In 
the meantime, we cannot but share the view of Baldwin et al. (2013, p. 1), that the world trading system is in a state 
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